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The aim of the present paper is to assess the new classical/real business cycle revolution, 
which  dethroned  Keynesian  macroeconomics.  In  its  first  part,  I  critically  discuss  the 
microfoundations requirement that constitutes a cornerstone of the new approach and suggest 
an alternative, softer, formulation of it. The conclusion of this discussion is that the new 
classical/real  business  cycle  revolution  marked  a  transition  from  a  soft  to  a  demanding 
understanding of the microfoundations requirement. In the second part of the paper, I present 
additional  salient  traits  of  the  new  classical  and  the  real  business  cycle  stages  of  the 
revolution. While each of these stages brought a specific contribution to the revolution, I 
emphasize the decisive role played by Kydland and Prescott in re-orienting the type of work 
in which macroeconomists were engaged. Finally, in part three, I ponder upon the causes of 
this revolution. After presenting and assessing Prescott’s and Lucas’s accounts of the factors 
which gave rise to the new approach, I venture into muddier waters by raising the question of 
whether a political agenda underpinned the NC/RBC revolution.  
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As will be documented in this paper, there are good reasons for viewing the transition from 
Keynesian  IS-LM  macroeconomics  to  dynamic  stochastic  macroeconomics  as  a  scientific 
revolution à la Kuhn. This expression refers to an episode in the history of a given discipline 
where a period of normal science is disturbed because of the persistent existence of apparently 
unsolvable  puzzles  and  a  drive  to  move  the  agenda  and  the  research  methods  into  new 
directions. This goes along with thundering declarations of war — Keynesian theory is dead 
— a confrontation between the young and the old generation, the rise of new stars in the 
profession and the eclipse of old ones. The relevance of the concept of a scientific revolution 
hinges on the existence of a ‘before’ and an ‘after’, with a well delineated series of events in 
between,  so  that  the  type  of  work  members  of  the  community  are  engaged  in  after  the 
revolution bears little resemblance to earlier practices.  
This revolution — at present often viewed as having led to the rise of DSGE (dynamic-
stochastic  general  equilibrium)  macroeconomics  —  occurred  in  two  stages.  The  first  is 
associated  with  Robert  Lucas’s  work  and  has  often  been  labeled  the  ‘new  classical 
revolution’.  The  second  is  associated  with  Kydland  and  Prescott  and  real  business  cycle 
models. To capture this two-step process, I shall refer to it as the new classical/real business 
cycle revolution (henceforth NC/RBC) rather than the DSGE revolution.
1 In a nutshell, Lucas 
did the job of attacking the Keynesian paradigm and of introducing a series of new concepts 
and  principles.  Kydland  and  Prescott’s  transformed  Lucas’s  qualitative  modeling  into  a 
quantitative  research  program  —  as  Greenwood  ([1994]  2005,  p.1)  put  it,  they  took 
macroeconomics to the computer. Of course, many other researchers played an important role 
in  this  revolution,  in  particular  Sargent,  Barro,  Wallace,  Plosser  and  Long.  Lucas,  and 
Kydland and Prescott have nonetheless been its towering figures, with Kydland playing a 
more subdued role in the Kydland and Prescott duo, at least as far as the defense of their joint 
work is concerned.  
Several questions arise: What were the causes of the NC/RBC revolution? What changes did 
it bring about? Did it have a political dimension? These are the issues I wish to tackle in this 
paper. It comprises three parts. The NC/RBC revolution is often presented as having consisted 
of giving macroeconomics the microfoundations it lacked. I appraise this characterization in 
the first part of the paper. In the second, I bring out the different points on which the new way 
of doing macroeconomics differed from the old one. Finally, in part three, I ponder upon the 
causes of this revolution. I start with a discussion of Prescott’s and Lucas’s accounts of the 
revolution, after which, entering into more troubled waters, I raise the question of whether 
there was a political agenda underpinning the NC/RBC revolution.  
                                                 
1 An additional reason for not using the DSGE terminology is that, with the appearance of new neoclassical 




A MATTER OF MICROFOUNDATIONS?  
A new methodological requirement 
From  the  1970s  onwards,  a  new  methodological  principle  came  to  prominence  in 
macroeconomics, the microfoundations requirement. It became the sine qua non of valid 
theoretical practice: the condition for a macroeconomic model to be microfounded is that it 
starts  with  the  description  of  how  agents  make  their  choices,  these  being  made  in  an 
optimizing  way.  An  objective  function  is  to  be  maximized  or  minimized  under  given 
constraints. For all its generality, this condition is nonetheless deemed sufficient to identify 
models that do not accord with it, and thence ought to be rejected.
2  
The same requirement has been expressed differently by Lucas and Sargent (and Lucas on 
his own) under the name of ‘equilibrium discipline’. It states that, to be valid, economic 
models should rest on two postulates: (a) that agents act in their own self-interest and their 
behavior is optimal; and (b) that markets clear (Lucas and Sargent [1979] 1994, p. 15). The 
‘discipline’ term is used to convey the view that this is a rule that economists impose upon 
themselves, and which stamps their specific way of looking at social reality. Accepting such 
a  standpoint  results  in  proclaiming  that  the  notion  of  disequilibrium,  which  before  was 
widely used, should be banned from the economic lexicon.  
Two  additional remarks  are  worth  making.  First,  the  insistence  on  the microfoundations 
requirement  did  not  stem  from  microeconomists  wanting  to  assess  the  good  practice  of 
macroeconomists from the standpoint of their own sub-discipline. Rather, it originated from 
within the macroeconomic community, the result of a gradual awareness by some of its 
members that something was wrong with the existing practice of the discipline, and that this 
malaise had to do with its drift away from microeconomics. Actually, new classicals were 
not the first macroeconomists to be preoccupied with microfoundations. It all started with 
Keynesian  economists,  such  as  Patinkin  (1965),  Clower  ([1965]  1984),  and  Barro  and 
Grossman (1971), who set themselves the task of improving Keynesian theory by giving it 
more rigorous foundations. It is only in a second stage that the microfoundations requirement 
came to be associated with external criticism of Keynesian theory. Second, it is sometimes 
claimed that new classicists invented market clearing. This is not true. Market clearing (i.e. 
the idea that supply and demand always match in a given period of exchange) is of long 
standing in economics. Its presence in Walrasian theory is beyond dispute. But the same is 
                                                 
2  The  intuition  behind  the requirement  is  well  expressed  in  the following  quotation from  an  interview with 
Lucas:  “I  think  a  lot  of  the  work  in  Keynesian  economics  has  gotten  too  far  away  from  thinking  about 
individuals and their decisions at all. Keynesians don’t often worry about what actual  individuals are doing. 
They look at mechanical statistical relationships that have no connection with what real individuals are actually 
doing” (Lucas 1989).  3 
 
  
true  for  Marshallian  theory  (with  the  additional  complication  that  market  clearing  and 
disequilibrium  can  coexist,  see  De  Vroey,  2007).  By  challenging  this  consensus  in  the 
profession, Keynes was clearly thinking out of the box. Thus, rather than having invented 
market clearing, new classicists have just restored it at a higher level, signaling the end of the 
Keynesian recess. Still, the pace at which the microfoundations requirement conquered the 
profession is impressive. More curiously, this conquest occurred without any justification 
being provided, as if the case was so obvious that none was needed.  
Lucas’s criticism of Keynesian theory and modeling  
The gist of Lucas’s criticism of Keynesian theory is that it does not abide by the equilibrium 
discipline. His attack develops at two levels. The first pertains to the general way in which 
Keynes addressed the issue of unemployment in his General Theory. In Lucas’s eyes, the 
mere  aim  of  wanting  to  produce  a  theory  of  involuntary  unemployment  constitutes  an 
infringement of the equilibrium discipline (Lucas [1977] 1981).  
After freeing himself of the straightjacket (or discipline) imposed by the classical 
postulates,  Keynes  described  a  model  in  which  rules  of  thumb,  such  as  the 
consumption  function  and  liquidity  preference  schedule,  took  the  place  of 
decision functions that a classical economist would insist be derived from the 
theory of choice. And rather than require that wages and prices be determined by 
the postulate that markets clear ― which for the labor market seemed patently 
contradicted  by  the  severity  of  business  depressions  ―  Keynes  took  as  an 
unexamined postulate that money wages are sticky, meaning that they are set at a 
level or by a process that could be taken as uninfluenced by the macroeconomic 
forces he proposed to analyze (Lucas and Sargent [1979] 1994, p. 15). 
Keynes’s lapse from the equilibrium discipline, Lucas is ready to admit, is understandable in 
view of the apparent contradiction between cyclical phenomena and economic equilibrium in 
the  context  of  the  Great  Depression.  Still,  ex  post  it  ought  to  be  interpreted  as  having 
prompted a long detour in the progress of economic theory. It is an example of “bad social 
science: an attempt to explain important aspects of human behavior without reference either 
to what people like or what they are capable of doing” (Lucas, 1981, p. 4).  
The second level of criticism is the well-known ‘Lucas critique’ ([1976] 1981). Here his 
target is the macroeconometric models of the time, all of which had a Keynesian inspiration. 
Lucas’s claim is that, although they do a fairly good job of forecasting, these models are a 
failure as far as the assessment of alternative policies is concerned. Their main flaw is their 
lack  of  microfoundations.  This  leads  to  endogenous  variables,  sensitive  to  variations  in 
economic  policy,  being  transformed  into  exogenous  ones.  As  a  result,  a  model  of  the 
economy estimated at a period during which a particular institutional regime holds sway will 
provide  inadequate  information  for  assessing  what  might  occur  under  a  different  regime. 4 
 
  
According to Lucas, to avoid this defect, the parameters of the model need to be ‘deeply 
structural’. That is, they must be derived from the fundamentals of the economy, agents’ 
preferences, and technological constraints.  
Assessing the equilibrium discipline principle  
Before appraising the validity of Lucas’s twofold criticism, it is worth pondering upon the 
equilibrium discipline as posited by Lucas and Sargent, independent of its use as a weapon 
against  Keynesian  theory.  It  is  a  fact  that,  since  the  inception  of  political  economy,  the 
equilibrium notion has played a central role in it. So the idea of equilibrium discipline as the 
hallmark of economics makes sense. However, I am unconvinced by the way in which Lucas 
and Sargent conceive it. First of all, contrary to what they say, it actually contains only one 
criterion. Optimal behavior and market clearing are two faces of the same coin. They grasp 
the  same  reality  at  two  distinct  levels:  optimal  behavior  refers  to  individual  or  personal 
equilibrium, while market clearing relates to what could be called ‘interactive equilibrium’, a 
state  where  all  individual  optimal  plans  have  been  made  compatible.  Moreover,  their 
conception hides under the rug a distinction that I, for one, find crucial. It was expressed long 
ago by Hayek and Patinkin but subsequently felt into oblivion:  
I have long felt that the concept of equilibrium itself and the methods which we 
employ in pure analysis have a clear meaning only when confined to the analysis of 
the action of a single person and that we are really passing into a different sphere 
and silently introducing a new element of altogether different character when we 
apply it to the explanation of the interactions of a number of different individuals 
(Hayek [1937] 1948, p. 35). 
A similar insight is to be found under Patinkin’s name when he draws a distinction between 
individual experiments and market experiments (1965, pp. 11–12 and 387–392).
3 It follows 
from Hayek’s and Patinkin’s standpoints that the notions of the optimizing planning and 
optimizing  behavior  designate  different  realities.  Optimizing  planning  refers  to  agents’ 
intentions as existing before the opening of trading, the solution to the choice-theoretical 
                                                 
3  Yeager  aptly  commented  on  this  distinction:  “An  individual  experiment  involves  discovering,  at  least 
conceptually, the desired behavior of an individual person, of a small or large group of individuals, or even of all 
individuals in the community, acting in certain capacities, under certain specified circumstances. Whether these 
circumstances are compatible with other economic conditions and whether they can in fact prevail (whether they 
are genuinely or even conceptually attainable, to use the Chicago terminology) is beside the point: it is not the 
purpose of an individual experiment, by itself, to describe the economic equilibrium that will tend to emerge. … 
This other type of analysis, which pulls together the results of various individual experiments, examines the 
conditions under which the plans of various persons would and would not mesh, describes the processes at work 
when plans fail to mesh, and describes the equilibrium position, is what Patinkin means by market experiments” 
(Yeager 1960, p. 59). 5 
 
  
problem they are faced with.
4 Optimizing behavior refers to what is observable after trading 
has started. Thus, optimizing behavior implies that the optimizing plan has been realized. 
The  gist  of  the  above  quotations  is  that  optimal  plan  and  optimal  behavior  need  to  be 
logically separated ― there is a difference between finding a solution to a choice problem 
and implementing this solution. Whenever optimizing behavior is the sole concept used, the 
possibility of there being a difference between them is discarded by definition.  
This  difference  can  also  be  expressed  with  reference  to  the  notions  of  equilibrium  and 
disequilibrium.  Individual  equilibrium  is  a  state  where  an  agent  is  able  to  achieve  one 
element  of  his  or  her  optimal  plan.  Individual  disequilibrium  refers  to  the  opposite,  the 
inability of some agents to have their optimal plans transformed into optimal behavior. Note 
that this notion does not run counter to the view that agents are rational and develop optimal 
plans. Equilibrium tout court is what I labeled interactive equilibrium above. “The general 
equilibrium implies that all subsets of agents are in equilibrium and in particular that all 
individual  agents  are  in  equilibrium”  (McKenzie  1987,  p.  498).  That  is,  interactive  (or 
market)  equilibrium  requires  individual  equilibrium.  McKenzie’s  quotation  confirms  my 
view  that  optimizing  behavior  and  market  clearing  are  one  and  the  same  thing. 
Symmetrically, in the conception that I defend, optimal plan and market clearing are distinct 
while market non-clearing and individual disequilibrium go hand in hand.  
It  remains  to  assess  whether  the  two  distinct  potential  criteria  for  the  microfoundations 
requirement, optimizing planning and market clearing, are valid candidates for this function. 
Adopting  optimal  planning  as  a  postulate  raises  no  serious  objections.  It  amounts  to 
assuming that agents have the ability to optimally solve any decision problem they encounter 
(with  the  ensuing  correlates  of  rationality,  information  and  rational  expectations).  This 
assumption is certainly an exaggeration, yet it is nonetheless acceptable as it is probably 
better, and certainly more tractable, than alternative assumptions. 
But the same is not true for the second component, market clearing. I see no reason to adopt 
it as a condition for sound economic reasoning. Market clearing is the consequence of some 
prior assumptions related to ‘trade technology’, i.e. the institutional set-up that is needed to 
make the realization of equilibrium possible. Like other Walrasian models, Lucas’s models 
are based on the tâtonnement or auctioneer hypothesis. This theoretical scenario explains 
how the equilibrium values calculated by the economist when studying the logical existence 
of a general equilibrium could come into existence in the artificial economy described by the 
model. As soon as this hypothesis is made, the matter is sealed: market clearing always 
occurs. Thus, market clearing is the direct consequence of the auctioneer hypothesis rather 
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endowment ― to be a ‘utility-computer’ into whom we ‘feed’ a sequence of market prices and from whom we 
obtain a corresponding sequence of ‘solutions’ in the form of specified optimum positions” (1965, p. 7). 6 
 
  
than  a  consequence  of  self-interest  and  rationality.  The  problem  with  the  auctioneer 
hypothesis  is  that  it  runs  counter  to  the  essential  nature  of  the  theory’s  theoretical 
explanandum,  because  it  amounts  to  picturing  a  decentralized  system  as  a  centralized 
organization of trade.
5  
To conclude the discussion of this point, claiming that macroeconomics ought to be based on 
the microfoundations requirement is fine by me, in so far as this requirement is understood as 
just stating that agents ought to be modeled as elaborating optimizing plans before entering 
into exchange relations. This is a softer, less stringent definition than Lucas and Sargent’s . In 
particular, no a priori ban is put on the notion of individual disequilibrium.  
An appraisal of Lucas’s two criticisms 
My reconsideration of the equilibrium discipline leaves Lucas’s critique intact. There is no 
need to revise it since it bears on  agents’ devising of their optimal plans. If the rational 
expectations assumption is accepted, Lucas is right to claim that agents should change their 
optimal plans whenever the policy regime is modified.
 6 
Lucas’s  more  general  criticism  of  Keynesian  theory  is  different.  If  my  understanding  of 
equilibrium  discipline  is  adopted,  his  criticism  falls,  and  so  the  ban  on  individual 
disequilibrium ought to be removed. Keynes’s project of constructing a theory of involuntary 
unemployment as a case of individual disequilibrium is compatible with my conception of the 
microfoundations requirement. Actually, several elements testify that Keynes reasoning was 
based on microfoundations: he assumed that firms were maximizing profits — the marginal 
efficiency of capital is a scheme enabling outlays in new capital to abide by the maximization 
of profits purpose. Keynes also assumed that households were arbitraging between bonds and 
liquidity. The definition of involuntary unemployment in Chapter Two of Keynes’s General 
Theory is a case of agents being unable to make their optimizing plan come through, which 
implies  that  agents  are  devising  optimal  plans.  Admittedly,  these  were  just  sweeping 
assertions in Keynes’s writing. But then he was a Marshallian, and followed Marshall in 
asserting that supply and demand functions were choice-theoretically underpinned without 
bothering to develop this point fully. Nothing as elaborate as microfoundations à la Walras 
can be found in Keynes’s work.  
                                                 
5 See De Vroey (1998) for further discussion of this point. 
6 However, the first model builders deserve some indulgence because of the undeveloped state of technique at 
the time. Klein anticipated the need for microfoundations, as is clear from the first book he wrote for t Lucas 
[1973]  1981)  he  Cowles  Foundation,  Economic  Fluctuations  in  the  United  States,  1921-1942  (Klein 
[1950] 1964). New classicists could subscribe to the program he set out there. However, when, in his joint work 
with Goldberger, An Econometric Model of the United States 1929-1952 (Klein and Goldberger, 1955), he came 
to setting out a full-blown model, he had to back down and adopt pragmatic solutions. Moreover, at the time 




To add a final note on this point, looking at Keynes’s non-theoretical writings, I have found in 
his correspondence a passage that Lucas could have written in support of his Critique. It 
relates to the discussion of Tinbergen’s work. 
I  also  want  to  emphasize  strongly  the  point  about  economics  being  a  moral 
science. I mentioned before that it deals with introspection and with values. I 
might  have  added  that  it  deals  with  motives,  expectations,  psychological 
uncertainties. One has to be constantly on guard against treating the material as 
constant and homogeneous. It is as though the fall of the apple to the ground 
depended on the apple’s motives, on whether the ground wanted the apple to fall, 
and on mistaken calculations on the part of the apple as to how far it was from the 
centre of the earth (Moggridge 203, p. 300). 
So,  with  a  little  stretch  of  the  imagination,  we  may  attribute  to  Keynes  the  view  that 
Tinbergen should have refrained from engaging in empirical work because this would breach 
the microfoundations requirement! 
Hitherto,  I  have  taken  it  for  granted  that  the  microfoundations  requirement  and  the 
equilibrium discipline are one and the same thing. It now turns out that my reservations lie 
less with the microfoundations aspect (in as far as it is redefined in my way) than with the 
pervasiveness of equilibrium. As already claimed, I do not think that we should accept that, as 
a matter of principle, states of individual disequilibrium are expelled from the lexicon of 
authorized economic concepts. 
But there is more to it than that. In De Vroey (2004b), I showed that neither Keynes nor his 
disciples achieved the program that was spelled out in the General Theory. Constructing a 
theory of involuntary unemployment, the emblematic case of individual disequilibrium, under 
the conditions set out by Keynes, has proven to be a daunting task, so daunting as to fall under 
the spell of the Wittgensteinian adage that one ought to be silent on issues about which one 
lacks the ability to speak properly.  
In other words, there are grounds for arguing in favor of macroeconomics continuing to be 
based on the equilibrium discipline as conceived by Lucas, until a ‘disequilibrium revolution’ 
occurs. However, this line is commendable only as a solution of expediency, since it is due to 
macroeconomists’  inability  to  conceptualize  individual  disequilibrium  and  market  non-
clearing in a rewarding and robust way. Lucas and Sargent’s flaw  is to have transformed this 
expediency  into  a  virtue.  Instead  of  boasting  about  the  equilibrium  discipline, 
macroeconomists should view it as a mark of their limited capability. To put it another way, 
my quarrel with NC/RBC economists here is less about their substantive position (i.e. the 




Is it fine to characterize the NC/RBC revolution as having introduced microfoundations into 
macroeconomics?  Yes  and  no!  In  my  view,  what  occurred  was  a  shift  from  a  soft 
understanding of the microfoundations requirement — the injunction that agents ought to be 
depicted as elaborating optimizing plans — to a strong understanding enunciating that they 
must be depicted as behaving in an optimizing way. Keynes inaugurated the soft requirement 
line  of  research.  Before  him,  the  strong  requirement  prevailed  unwittingly.  Thus,  the 
revolution amounted to the restoration of an earlier prevailing state of affairs. Be it only for 
this reason, the 'new classical' terminology is apposite: the old premises are reasserted in a 
more explicit and vigorous way.  
 
FURTHER CHARACTERIZATION OF THE NC/RBC REVOLUTION  
A stated above, the NC/RBC revolution was a two-step process, the first being associated 
with Lucas (the new classical phase of the revolution), and the second with Kydland and 
Prescott (the real business cycle phase). Below, I will explore the changes in perspective that 
occurred in each of these two steps.  
The new classical phase 
Lucas’s  role  was  twofold.  First,  treading  in  Friedman’s  footsteps,  he  launched  an  all-out 
attack on Keynesian macroeconomics. Positively, he introduced a series of new concepts and 
methodological  perspectives.  They  were  not  necessarily  his  inventions  —  the  obvious 
example is the notion of rational expectations, introduced by Muth — nor was he the only 
person to bring them to the forefront, but he did provide the impulse. The assumption of 
rational expectations and inter-temporal substitution are the cornerstones of the new approach 
(in addition to the equilibrium discipline). As these two aspects are familiar, I will focus more 
on some less well-known features of the new approach.
8 
Merging the fields of value theory and business cycle theory 
The NC/RBC revolution modified the boundaries between the economic sub-disciplines of 
value theory and business cycle theory, with business cycle theory being absorbed by value 
theory.
9  Before  the  revolution  these  fields  were  separate.  Evolving  at  a  high  level  of 
abstraction, value theory was based on trade technology or information assumptions resulting 
in  the  universality  of  market  clearing.  By  contrast,  business  cycle  theory  consisted  of 
qualitative, descriptive accounts of the unfolding of economies over time. Studies in this field 
aimed to provide specific explanations of fluctuations rather than a general theory. Although 
                                                 
8 For a pioneering, but still useful, assessment of the new classical approach, see Hoover (1988). 
9 In what follows, value theory, equilibrium theory and price theory will be considered synonymous. 9 
 
  
the notion of equilibrium was only vaguely referred to, it was taken for granted that the cycle 
was a manifestation of economic disequilibrium.
10 Against this background, Keynes’ aim in 
the General Theory may be reconstructed as an attempt to move unemployment away from 
the field of business cycle theory into that of value theory without implying that these two 
fields should be merged.  
The new classical revolution took another path, to make the business cycle part of value 
theory while expelling unemployment altogether from the enlarged field. Two implications of 
this widening of the scope of value theory are worth mentioning. First, the idea now prevails 
that  a  theory  of  the  business  cycle  can  be  constructed  without  resorting  to  the  notion  of 
unemployment,  a  view  that  was  inconceivable  before.  The  second  implication  is  that the 
earlier judgments about the harmful character of business cycles were erroneous. Business 
cycles are no longer considered to be a manifestation of some malfunctioning. The earlier 
received wisdom that the state should intervene in order to mitigate fluctuations ceases to be 
valid. 
A change in the research agenda 
Nowadays, macroeconomics is loosely defined as the study of business fluctuations. But this 
was  not  true  in  the  heyday  of  Keynesian  macroeconomics.  Then,  unemployment,  it  was 
proclaimed, was macroeconomics' central object. Macroeconomics arose in the wake of the 
Great Depression from the wish to bring to the fore the existence of trading failures which, it 
was presumed, it was the role of the state to act upon. Small wonder that social reformers 
supported it. Unemployment was considered the main dysfunction. This state of mind was 
still present at the beginning of the 1970s.
11 But then, in a sweeping change, unemployment 
ceased  to  be  an  important  preoccupation  of  macroeconomists.  It  fell  out  of  fashion, 
macroeconomists being glad to send it back to labor economists.  
The replacement of Marshallian macroeconomics with Walrasian macroeconomics 
Elsewhere (De Vroey, 2004b) I have claimed that Keynesian macroeconomics ought to be 
considered  as  a  simplified  Marshallian  general  equilibrium  theory.  Admittedly,  this  is  an 
unusual claim. Economists’ reflex when seeing the term ‘general equilibrium’, is to associate 
it with Walrasian or neo-Walrasian theory as if these were the only ways of studying the 
                                                 
10 This split was already present in Marshall’s work. Take his treatment of unemployment. No room for it existed 
in Marshall’s value theory, its proper place being in business cycle theory. In Matthews’s words (1990, p. 35), 
unemployment was par excellence a ‘Volume II’ subject. 
11 A testimony to this is Tobin’s 1971 Presidential Address to the American Economic Association, in which he 
wrote that macroeconomics deprived of the concept of full employment was unimaginable (1972, p. 1), not 
realizing that such a state of affairs was just around the corner. 10 
 
  
economy  as  a  whole.  To  me,  alternative  approaches  are  conceivable,  the  Marshallian 
approach being the main one.
12 
The difference between the two approaches results from the consideration of various criteria: 
the purpose of economic theory; methodology (including the role of mathematics); the ways 
of  looking  at  the  working  of  the  economy  as  whole;  the  conception  of  equilibrium 
underpinning the theories; and, finally, the trade organization assumptions (De Vroey, 2009c). 
Here, I want to focus on how Marshall and Walras tackled the issue of the working of the 
economy as a whole.  
Marshall viewed the analysis of economics as so complex that he thought it wise to approach 
it gradually. To all intents and purposes, he divided the economy into industries, to be studied 
separately. Moreover, since the analysis of time was so tricky, he distinguished three time 
categories: the market day (the unit period of exchange); the short period; and the long period. 
This strategy amounted to postponing the study of the functioning of the economy as a whole 
(i.e.  the  piecing  together  of  these  partial  results)  to  a  stage  at  which  enough  separate 
understanding  of  its  parts  had  been  reached.  Marshall  made  it  his  priority  to  study  the 
particular rectangles in the upper part of Figure 1 (branches of the economy during a given 
time span) separately. The point was not that theory should be confined to the study of a 
single rectangle, it was rather that economists needed to proceed gradually. For example, in 
his fishing industry example, Marshall studied the gravitational process between market-day, 
short-period and long-period equilibrium within an industry — that is, in terms of the Figure, 
he looked at vertical connections. He also endeavored to construct horizontal connections. 
Except for his Note XXI in the Principles’ Mathematical Appendix, he hardy entered into the 
study of the economy as a whole.  
No such two-tier strategy is to be found in Walras’s work. This is premised on the view that, 
from the onset, the object of study should be an entire economy. Simplifications had, of 
course, to be introduced, but they pertained to the characterization of the economy as a 
whole  and  did  not  involve  dividing  it  into  separate  sub-entities.  Walras  inaugurated  his 
analysis  with  the  most  rudimentary  economy  possible,  a  two-good  exchange  economy, 
where the two goods (oats and wheat) constituted the entire economy. He started by deriving 
the offer and demand curves from agents’ optimal plans, in order to study the equilibrium of 
the economy next. This done, Walras moved on to consider a slightly more complicated 
economy, an n-good exchange economy. His next step was to introduce production into the 
picture. In the end, he had a chain of encompassing models, starting from the simplest and 
                                                 
12 Hicks wrote Value and Capital ([1939] 1946), a contribution to Walrasian theory, and the IS-LM model, a 
contribution to Marshallian theory, in roughly the same period. This led many commentators to believe that the 
IS-LM model was Walrasian, without investigating the matter further. In my opinion, it is Marshallian (see De 
Vroey 2004b). 11 
 
  
moving towards greater and greater completeness: the two-good exchange-economy model, 
the  n-good  exchange-economy  model,  the  production  model,  the  capital-formation  and 
credit-economy  model  and,  finally,  the  monetary-economy  model.  Figure  1  illustrates 
Marshall’s and Walras’s strategies diagrammatically. 
Figure 1. Marshall and Walras’s models for simplifying the real economy 
 
One rarely hears of Marshallian general equilibrium models. However, Keynesian macro-
econometric models, as developed along the lines pioneered by Klein and Goldberg (1955) 
fit my description of a Marshallian economy remarkably well. In these models, the economy 
is sub-divided into separate sectors of activity. Initially these were limited in number, each 
being accounted for by a few equations: the consumption sector, the investment sector, the 
monetary  sector,  the  employment  sector,  the  government,  and  the  international  sector. 
Progress was seen as consisting of adding new equations to the models. It was assumed that 
these additions would make the model more descriptively accurate. They certainly made 
them bigger and bigger. Each sector became the object of a separate theoretical treatment. 12 
 
  
Little consideration was given to overall consistency, that is to the piecing together of the 
various sectoral analyses. 
All these traits place these models within a Marshallian representation of the economy. This 
was well perceived by the pioneers of the new classical approach. Look for example at the 
following passage drawn from an interview with Sargent. Although he does not mention 
either Marshall or Walras by name, what Sargent describes is nothing other than a shift from 
a Marshallian to a Walrasian framework: 
The earlier literature proceeded as if you could build an optimizing consumption 
function, an optimizing investment schedule, an optimizing portfolio schedule, in 
isolation from one another. They are essentially partial equilibrium exercises which 
were then put together at the end. The Brookings model, built in [19]65, is a good 
example  of  this  practice.  They  handed  out  these  various  schedules  to  different 
people and put them together at the end. The force of rational expectations is that it 
imposes  a  general  equilibrium  discipline.  In  order  to  figure  out  people’s 
expectations you had to assume consistency (Klamer 1984, p. 66). 
The Marshallian splitting up of the economy into separate sectors, each studied in isolation 
from the others, is absent from Walrasian macroeconomics. The latter witnesses a return to 
square one of Walras’s program, the study of the simplest possible model economy (with, 
however, a few departures from Walras’s original framework). Take Lucas’s “Expectations 
and the Neutrality of Money” article (Lucas [1972] 1981). It features a three-good production 
economy (c, c’ and leisure), in which c and c’ are physically identical yet are consumed at 
different dates. The physical good is non-storable. Because of the self-employment assump-
tion, only two goods are traded at any time (leisure and either c or c’): substitution is both 
intra-  and  inter-period.  This  is  not  a  far  cry  from  Walras  two-goods  exchange  economy 
model. 
The real business cycle stage 
Beyond doubt, there is a relationship of continuity between real business cycle models and 
Lucas’s work.
13 They are based on the same conceptual ingredients: a perfectly competitive 
economy, the equilibrium discipline, rational expectations, a stochastic dynamic environment, 
and inter-temporal substitution. The three main departures Kydland and Prescott (1982) made 
from Lucas’s approach were: abandoning his view of a money-driven cycle, an important 
move, which also meant a departure from the Friedmanian vision; replacing imperfect perfect 
information: engaging in applied work. This second change deserves further attention.  
                                                 
13 No surprise here. Lucas and Prescott were in close contact and had engaged in joint work, for example their 
1971 paper, “Investment under uncertainty”. 13 
 
  
In his “Methods and problems in business cycle theory”  paper, Lucas ([1980] 1981, p. 288) 
stated that the task ahead was to write a FORTRAN program. As he wrote in a related paper, 
the macroeconomist’s aim must be to construct “a fully articulate artificial economy which 
behaves through time so as to imitate closely the time series behavior of actual economies” 
(Lucas [1977] 1981, p. 219). However, Lucas himself contributed little to this enterprise. In 
contrast, Kydland and Prescott took Lucas’s injunction literally and devoted themselves to the 
task of transforming a qualitative type of modeling into a quantitative one (Woodford 1999, p. 
25). 
The work involved was titanic. To give the uninformed reader a taste of what it involved, let 
me survey the different steps that Kydland and Prescott took in their pathbreaking “Time to 
build and aggregate fluctuations” paper (1982).
14 Two parallel tasks were involved. On the 
one hand, work had to be done on real-world data, which often needed to be rearranged. On 
the other hand, the model had to be constructed and computed.  
The first part of the first task was to gather growth data. At the start of their work, Kydland 
and Prescott also found it necessary to make the national accounting categories consistent 
with their theory. In their model, there was no government sector, no household production 
sector, no inventories, and no foreign sector. As a result, the data relating to these sectors 
needed to be reassigned. Moreover, national accounts categories are built on the premise that 
consumer durables are part of consumption. However, from their theoretical viewpoint, they 
should be included in capital stock, and their flow assigned to GNP. Another important job 
was to de-trend the data. Business cycles are defined as occurring with a frequency of three to 
five years around the trend. To isolate them, it is necessary to eliminate lower-frequency 
movements, related to long-run factors. The most widely used filter in the real business cycle 
literature is the Hodrick-Prescott filter (Hodrick and Prescott 1980).  
As to the model economy, several steps are involved. The first is to assign a precise functional 
form to production and utility that is consistent with the facts on growth. Adhering to the 
equilibrium discipline, Kydland and Prescott restricted their attention to model economies that 
displayed balanced growth. They opted for a Cobb-Douglas production function, integrating a 
productivity variable, and a utility function restricted to a unitary elasticity of substitution 
between leisure and consumption. These functional forms are still widely used today. The 
first  choice  is  justified  by  the  fact  that  capital’s  and  labor’s  shares  of  output  have  been 
approximately constant in the US in the period since WWII. The second is vindicated by the 
combination of a roughly constant level of leisure per capita and of a large rise in the real 
wage rate. Luckily, these two functional forms also happen to be the most tractable ones.  
                                                 
14 See Kydland and Prescott (1991; 1996), Cooley and Prescott (2006). 14 
 
  
Assigning values to the parameters of the model economy is a crucial step in the program. To 
this end, Kydland and Prescott resorted to a new methodology, calibration,
 15 which differs 
from  econometric  testing.  This  method,  they  claimed,  was  already  in  use  in  the  natural 
sciences, as well as in computational general equilibrium theory. But, to say the least, they 
gave  it  a  new  impetus.  Calibration  consists  of choosing  values  for  the  model  economy’s 
parameters either by drawing on existing empirical studies, independent research or national 
accounting data or by applying economic theory. The more the parameters can be valued in 
the first way, the better. In their 1982 paper, Kydland and Prescott found themselves with six 
‘free’ parameters still in need of receiving a quantitative value. These pertained mainly to 
inter-temporal substitution and technology shocks. Different values could be calculated for 
their  various  combinations.  Kydland  and  Prescott  choose  those  that  resulted  in  a  close 
correspondence between the moments predicted by the model and those of the real-world 
series.  
The  next  task  is  to  solve  the  model.  The  equilibrium  process  ought  to  be  computed  and 
simulated  to  generate  equilibrium  paths  for  the  model  economy,  using  the  recursive 
competitive equilibrium concept (Stockey and Lucas 1989). Again, this part of the program is 
central. More often than not, it is a time-consuming activity which turned macroeconomists 
into computational experts. Finally, after an additional filtering procedure, the researcher can 
proceed to calculate the selected moments both for the model economy and for the rearranged 
real-world data and compare them.  
When all these steps are completed, a final assessment is possible. Kydland and Prescott’s 
account of their own research runs as follows:  
Using  the  standard  neoclassical  production  function,  standard  preferences  to 
describe  people’s  willingness  to  substitute  intra-  and  inter-temporally  between 
consumption and leisure, and an estimate of the technology shock variance, we 
found that the model economy displays business cycle fluctuations 70 percent as 
large as did the U.S. economy. This number is our answer to the posed question 
(Kydland and Prescott 1996, p. 74).  
In this description, I have referred to Kydland  and Prescott’s  ”Time to build” paper. In 
subsequent work, things have become easier because of the cumulative development of the 
approach. However the job to be done is still daunting. Much of it comprises working on the 
data and making computations, all tasks requiring long hours of tedious calculation.  
Merely asserting that qualitative modeling gave way to quantitative fails to convey the full 
measure of the change that took place. Behind this contrast lies another, more sociological, 
                                                 
15 For a presentation of the calibration method see, for example, Wickens (1995), Cooley (1997) or Prescott and 
Candler (2008). For its criticism see Hoover (1995). 15 
 
  
difference. To introduce it, let me remark that, in a certain way, the relationship between 
Lucas and  Kydland and Prescott replicates that  between Keynes  and his followers. What 
would have happened to the General Theory if its message had not been transposed into the 
IS-LM model, and if Klein had not extended this model into an econometric framework? 
While no answer can be provided to such a question, it reminds us that, in a field such as 
economics,  there  is  no  single  compelling  way  in  which  theory  will  evolve.  The  same 
conundrum arises over the relationship between Lucas, on the one hand, and Kydland and 
Prescott,  on  the  other.  Without  Kydland  and  Prescott,  would  the  seismic  change  that 
macroeconomics underwent have occurred? It is far from sure. Lucas’s conceptual papers 
were impressive but too highbrow to generate a huge following. As to Lucas’s criticism, its 
impact on the profession could have been limited to making modelers more cautious when 
drawing conclusions from their models, and not produced a radical change in method. To 
have a scientific revolution, an alternative way of doing applied work, providing new grist to 
the mill for the majority of members of the community, must be made available. This was 
Kydland and Prescott’s main contribution. 
Another trait of Kydland and Prescott’s approach is that it constitutes a marriage of sorts 
between Lausanne and Chicago economics, a move that purists of the two schools used to 
disapprove of. Earlier neo-Walrasian authors were skeptical of, if not opposed to, any direct 
transposition from a model to reality. To them, their models were  evolving at a level of 
abstraction which made them unfit for empirical testing. For example, Cass, whom Kydland 
and Prescott hailed as their forerunner, expressed his dissatisfaction with seeing his model 
transformed in the Kydland and Prescott way (Cass 1998).
 17 On the other side of the fence, 
Friedman, the emblematic Chicago economist, was radically opposed to Walrasian theory.
18 
In contrast, neither Kydland and Prescott nor Lucas have any qualms about such a mingling of 
the two traditions.  
Finally, another striking trait of Kydland and Prescott’s methodological standpoint is their 
unshakeable faith in neoclassical theory, that is any model with “agents maximizing, subject 
to constraints and market clearing” (Kydland and Prescott 1991, p. 164). This is just Lucas’s 
                                                 
17 Hahn is another example. “It is for all these reasons that I have always held the view that the Walrasian theory 
in all of its manifestations is an important theoretical benchmark but that a vast and unruly terrain had to be 
traversed  before  one  understood,  let  alone  predict,  the  behavior  of  an  actual  economy.  No  economist  and 
certainly no theorist should be ignorant of the Walrasian theory, and no economist and certainly no theorist 
should pronounce on actual economies and policies on its basis alone” (Hahn 1983, p. 224) 
18 See De Vroey (2009a) for a further discussion of this point. 16 
 
  
equilibrium discipline. When it comes to macroeconomics, they view the neoclassical growth 
model as the ‘established theory’.  
I view the growth model as a paradigm for macro analysis — analogous to the 
supply and demand construct of price theory (Prescott [1986] 1994, p. 266). 
Macroeconomics  has  progressed  beyond  the  stage  of  searching  for  a  theory  to 
deriving the implications of theory (Prescott 2006 p. 203-4).  
Klein  constructed  his  models  with  the  purpose  of  assessing  the  validity  of  Keynes’s 
‘hypothetical system’ (Klein 1955, p. 280). True, he had a somewhat biased way of engaging 
in this exercise by contriving to put the economy in a Keynesian regime with excess supply in 
the labor and the goods markets. Nonetheless the official aim of the enterprise was to put the 
theory to the test. This is no longer the case for Kydland and Prescott. The shift that occurred 
with  them  is  from  a  methodological  standpoint  where  the  validity  of  a  theory  has  to  be 
established to one where the aim is to apply a well-established theory.  
Earlier on, macroeconomists ‘believed’ in neoclassical theory but took it with a large pinch of 
salt — Solow being a fine example. This was the reason for their adhering to the neoclassical 
synthesis view. The latter encapsulated the idea that ‘classical’ theory was valid only in the 
long term, which in turn suggested that a non-classical theory (Keynesian theory) was needed 
to explain the here and now. This attitude of conditional or mitigated adhesion to neoclassical 
theory has now disappeared. 
 
EXPLAINING THE NC/RBC REVOLUTION 
Lucas’s and Prescott’s views 
As we have already seen, in his Nobel lecture, Prescott expresses his pride at having led a 
revolution that transformed macroeconomics. He described the state of affairs that prevailed 
before the revolution as follows: 
Prior to the transformation, macroeconomics was largely separate from the rest of 
economics. Indeed, some considered the study of macroeconomics fundamentally 
different and thought there was no hope of integrating macroeconomics with the 
rest of economics, that is with neoclassical economics. Others held the view that 
neoclassical foundations for the empirically-determined macro relations would in 
time be developed. Neither view was correct (Prescott 2006, p. 203). 
To Prescott, the change was mainly methodological. In his eyes, it was so radical that the term 
revolution  is  deserved,  and  so  compelling  that  it  could  not  but  win.  Beyond  these  broad 17 
 
  
declarations, he devoted little attention to what actually happened. Basically, it was scientific 
progress in action.
19  
For a more detailed account of the changes that went on, we may turn to Lucas’s “Methods 
and problems in business cycle theory” article ([1980] 1981). He considers three forces that 
may have been active: technical developments, outside events and the internal development of 
the  discipline.  In  his  eyes,  the  first  of  these  was  most  important.  He  views  progress  in 
economic theory mainly as a matter of discovering or applying new tools, new techniques for 
treating old issues. In effect, one leitmotif of Lucas’s methodological writings is that earlier 
economists felt the need to study the economy in a dynamic way but lacked the necessary 
tools.
20 Two important transformations took place to change this state of affairs. The first was 
the possibility of resorting to new mathematical tools, borrowed from engineering, such as 
control theory. They allowed for the construction of dynamic theory. The second was the 
increased computational ability associated with the tremendous progress that took place in 
computer science, paving the way for large-scale simulation work.  
As to new developments “thrown at us by the real world” (Lucas [1980] 1981, p. 272), Lucas 
dislikes giving them too much importance because this would run counter to his premise that 
all business cycles are basically alike.
21 He nonetheless considers two external influences that 
may  have  played  a  role  in  the  rise  of  new  classical  macroeconomics.  The  first  is  the 
stagflation  period  that  characterized  the  1970s.  To  him,  it  constituted  a  dramatic  quasi-
laboratory experiment that confirmed the rightness of Friedman’s intuition ([1977] 1981, p. 
221). However, Lucas stops short of claiming that this was a decisive cause of the change 
([1980] 1981,  pp.  282-283). The  second  is  the  fact  that  in  the  post-World  War  II  period 
business cycles have followed a regular pattern, giving weight to the view that they are a 
repeated occurrence of the ‘same’ event. All in all, however, he sees technical progress as the 
driving force:  
These new observations have been influential (as new observation should be to 
empirical researchers) but it seems to me that the main outside influences have 
been, and will continue to be, changes in available theoretical methods. In business 
                                                 
19 “The reign of this system-of-equations macroeconomic approach was not long. One reason for its demise was 
the  spectacular  predictive  failure  of  the  approach.  As  Lucas  and  Sargent  point  out,  in  1969  these  models 
predicted high unemployment would be associated with low inflation. Counter to this prediction, the 1970s saw 
a combination of both high unemployment and high inflation. Another reason for the demise of this approach 
was the general recognition  that policy-invariant behavioral equations are inconsistent with  the maximization 
postulate in dynamic settings.  The principal reason for the abandonment of the system-of-equations approach, 
however,  was  advances  in  neoclassical  theory  that  permitted  the  application  of  the  paradigm  in  dynamic 
stochastic  settings. Once the neoclassical  tools needed for modeling business cycle fluctuations existed,  their 
application to this problem and their ultimate domination over any other method was inevitable” (Kydland and 
Prescott 1991, pp. 166-167). 
20 See Lucas ([1980] 1981, p. 275), Lucas (1987, p. 2), Lucas (1996, p. 669-. 
21 Lucas admits that the Great Depression remains a “formidable barrier to a completely unbending application 
of the view that business cycles are all alike” (Lucas ([1980] 1981, p. 273).  18 
 
  
cycle theory, it appears not to be the problem that changes but rather the way we 
look at it. Of changes in methods, certainly the most central have been postwar 
developments in general equilibrium theory (Lucas [1980] 1981, p. 284).  
While  the  appearance  of  new  tools  made  the  change  in  approach  possible,  this  change 
manifested itself in internal theoretical developments. Most of Lucas’s paper on ‘Methods and 
problems’  is  devoted  to  these.  He  shows  how  post-WWII  economists  relied  upon  the 
stationary equilibrium concept. To them, the economy was in a state of disequilibrium as long 
as it departed from the stationary state. The business cycle was viewed as a manifestation of 
such a departure. Since disequilibrium was furthermore equated with a mismatch between 
supply and demand, the main form of which was the Keynesian case of excess supply, the 
business cycle was deemed to be a market failure. This was how an essentially static theory 
was supplemented with short-run dynamics, the basic insight of the neoclassical synthesis. 
According to Lucas, this framework, combining a static long-run equilibrium with short-run 
disequilibrium dynamics, was used for lack of a better one. This lack in turn was explained by 
the fact that a series of advances had not yet been made. In particular, possible lessons for the 
study of the business cycle had not yet been drawn from the Arrow-Debreu model. Once this 
was done, thanks to Lucas and his associates’ contributions, in conjunction with the technical 
advances that had become available, a radically new framework became possible, wherein 
“the  idea  that  an  economic  system  in  equilibrium  is  in  any  sense  ‘at  rest’  is  simply  an 
anachronism” (Lucas p. 207).  
An assessment 
On most scores, I can agree with Lucas’s interpretation. In particular, his emphasis on the role 
of new tools Lucas is well taken, an aspect that historians of economics tend to overlook. The 
story of NC/RBC macroeconomics starts with gifted young economists, who initially found it 
natural to do research in macroeconomics as it then existed (i.e. working within the Keynesian 
paradigm), but grew to think that important flaws in this paradigm had been pushed under the 
rug.  Eventually,  they  came  to  the  conclusion  that  a  radical  overhaul  was  required. 
Backtracking  rapidly,  they  returned  to  pre-Keynesian  insights  —  but  without  rejecting 
modern analytical methods. They also believed that much could be borrowed from the Arrow-
Debreu  model  and  its  development.  So,  the  ingredients  of  the  transition  to  NC/RBC 
macroeconomics  were  dissatisfaction  with  the  reigning  paradigm,  the  availability  of  new 
technical  tools,  borrowing  from  apparently  unrelated  parts  of  economics,  and  a  sense  of 
direction — the equilibrium discipline and firm methodological principles, such as the pre-
eminence of theory over pragmatism.
 22 
                                                 
22 Of course, I am aware that they tell the story from the ‘winners’ point of the view. The defenders of Keynesian 
macroeconomics have quite a different view. As Lipsey (2000, p. 76) wrote:  “To many Keynesians, the new 
classical programme replaced messy truth by precise error”. 19 
 
  
However,  I  diverge  from  Lucas’s  and  Prescott’s  claim  that  all  this  was  just  the  natural 
unfolding of theoretical progress. To Lucas, little is gained by interpreting the changes that 
took place as a scientific revolution: 
Research  in  my  field  of  specialization  —  macroeconomics,  or  monetary  and 
business cycle theory — has undergone rapid change in the past 15 years. One 
way  of  describing  some  of  these  changes  is  in  terms  of  ideological  contests 
between  rival  schools  of  thought:  the  ‘Keynesian  revolution’,  the  ‘monetarist 
counter-revolution’, and so on. There is no doubt something to be learned by 
tracing the main ideological currents in macroeconomic research, but I myself 
find most of this discussion of crises, revolutions and so on, unintelligible, and 
almost  wholly  unconnected  with  the  most  interesting  current  research  (Lucas 
1987, p. 1).
23 
Admittedly,  the  notion  of  scientific  revolution  should  not  be  applied  too  freely,  as  is 
sometimes  done.  I,  for  one,  consider  the  transition  from  Keynesian  to  NC/RBC 
macroeconomics to be the only occurrence of a Kuhnian revolution in macroeconomics to 
date.
24 While much of what happened can be filed under the heading of ‘progress’, this does 
not exhaust the matter. Some aspects of the changes are better viewed as a displacement of 
perspective than a linear progress. This applies, in particular, to the change in content of the 
equilibrium discipline, the relegation of unemployment from macroeconomics, and the shift 
from a Marshallian to a Walrasian framework. Moreover, the rise of the NC/RBC paradigm 
bears  all  the  sociological  hallmarks  of  a  scientific  revolution.  It  started  with  thundering 
declarations of war. It triggered a change of guard: the old elite of macroeconomists suddenly 
became ‘has beens’ while new figures rose to prominence. All this happened suddenly and 
rather violently (by academic standards). The title and content of Lucas and Sargent’s “After 
Keynesian  macroeconomics”  paper  ([1979]  1994)  is  often  perceived,  and  was  probably 
intended, as whistle-blowing. This attitude of not pulling punches is even more visible in the 
views expressed on circumstantial occasions, as the following extract from a talk given by 
Lucas at Graduate School of Chicago’s Annual Management Conference in 1979 and entitled 
“The death of Keynesian economics” illustrates: 
Keynesian economics is dead [maybe ‘disappeared’ is a better term]. Don’t know 
exactly when this happened but it is true today and it wasn’t true two years ago. 
This  is  a  sociological  not  an  economic  observation,  so  evidence  for  it  is 
sociological.  For  example,  one  cannot  find  a  good,  under-40  economist  who 
                                                 
23 For all his use of the term ‘revolution’, Prescott is no more a follower of Kuhn than Lucas is. 
24 I view the ‘Keynesian Revolution’ less as a revolution than as the first step in the constitution of the new sub-
discipline of macroeconomics, a simplified, applied and policy-oriented type of general equilibrium analysis. 
Nor should the transition towards new neoclassical synthesis models be considered a revolution. 20 
 
  
identifies  himself,  works  as  a  ‘Keynesian’.  Indeed,  people  even  take  offence  if 
referred  to  in  this  way.  At  research  seminars,  people  don’t  take  Keynesian 
theorizing seriously any more — audience starts to whisper, giggle to one another. 
Leading  journals  aren’t  getting  Keynesian  papers  submitted  any  more  (Lucas 
1979).  
The question may be asked as to what the ‘value added’ of my standpoint of wanting to 
combine the opposed intuitions of progress and scientific revolution is? The answer is ‘a grain 
of relativism’! Kuhn’s notion suggests that any new paradigm that emerges, having dethroned 
a pre-existing one, will be dethroned in its turn in the future. We may envisage, for example, 
that one day it will be possible to conceptualize the idea of individual disequilibrium so that 
the equilibrium approach will become passé. 
A political agenda? 
Is my above picture complete? Possibly not. Look at the following quotation from Blinder: 
I argue … that there was no anomaly, that the ascendancy of new classicism in 
academia  was  instead  a  triumph  of  a  priori  theorizing  over  empiricism,  of 
intellectual  aesthetics  over  observation  and,  in  some  measure,  of  conservative 
ideology over liberalism (Blinder [1988] 1997, p. 110).  
Blinder evokes a factor of which no trace is to be found in Lucas’s or Kydland and Prescott’s 
accounts. Blinder’s accusation is that the NC/RBC revolution, to some extent at least, resulted 
from the desire to promote a laissez faire approach and to dismiss the more interventionist 
Keynesian ideology that had previously prevailed.  
Clearly, such a line of thought will hardly be popular amongst economists. Most will reject it, 
be they friend or foe of the NC/RBC revolution. One underlying reason is the tremendous 
influence exerted by Friedman’s conception of the methodology of economics, asserting its 
positivistic character. A basic tenant of this view is that value judgments have no place in 
economic theory.  
For sure, it will be difficult to find NC/RBC macroeconomists claiming that they pursue a 
political agenda. Let me give just two examples of denials of the presence of such a purpose. 
The first is from Klamer’s interview with Sargent.  
[Klamer]: Are the political aspects an important question? 
[Sargent]: I am not really interested in politics. The rational expectations stuff is 
clearly  not  politically  motivated.  People  from  all  sorts  of  different  political 
perspectives contribute to it. It’s more a technical revolution. … No, it’s certainly 
not politically motivated (Klamer 1984, p. 80).  21 
 
  
My second example is Kehoe and Prescott’s reply to Temin’s (2008) criticism of their work 
in the Journal of Economic Literature. One of Temin’s indictments was that real business 
cycle authors were pursuing a political agenda. Kehoe and Prescott’s reacted by writing: 
We can assure Temin and readers of our book that there is no agenda in the book 
but a scientific one. The suggestion that we have such an agenda is yet another 
example of Temin’s lack of understanding of the book (Kehoe and Prescott 2009, p. 
21).
25 
I  have  no  reason  to  question  the  sincerity  of  Sargent,  Prescott,  and  other  authors  in  the 
NC/RBC  tradition.  But  for  several  reasons  that  does  not  close  the  question.  First  of  all, 
returning to square one, we must remember that political economy started with Adam Smith 
as a plea in favor of a system of economic liberty. In the Wealth of Nations positive and 
normative  aspects  are  intertwined.  Still  today,  an  important  part  of  the  theoretical 
conversation among economists bears on whether the invisible hand is doing its job. This is 
true, not for all fields of economics, but for those that deal with the economy as a whole, as is 
the case with macroeconomics. The issue at stake is how the market economy can best work 
— with or without state intervention, and, if with, to what extent? If an opinion about the 
ideal  organization  of  the  economy  is  ideological,  then  ideology  cannot  be  absent  from 
macroeconomics. To me, this is not a stigma. It just means that economics is less remote from 
political philosophy than is usually believed.
26 As to Friedman, for all my admiration for him, 
I find it difficult to swallow that he was a value-judgment-free economist. All his life he 
passionately pleaded the cause of laissez faire, using every type of argument he came across.  
What are the possible ideological views in presence in macroeconomics? In a recent paper 
(De  Vroey  2009b,  written  in  French)  I  have  distinguished  seven  degrees  of  economic 
liberalism with at its top ‘Austrian economic liberalism’ and at its bottom ‘communism’, 
complete state control of the economy. As far as macroeconomics is concerned, the spectrum 
can  be  limited  to  two  levels,  the  ‘laissez  faire’  and  the  ‘Keynesian’  conceptions.    The 
‘Keynesian’ modifier can be viewed as a catchword for grouping those authors who, although 
generally supportive of the market system, nonetheless believe that it can exhibit failures 
which state intervention, in particular demand  stimulation, can remedy. Here is Blinder’s 
account: 
A  normative  Keynesian  believes  that  government  should  use  its  leverage  over 
aggregate demand to reduce the amplitude of business cycles. He or she is probably 
                                                 
25 Lucas lapsed at least once into taking a more relativistic standpoint when he said in an interview that: “In 
economic policy, the frontier never changes. The issue is always mercantilism and government intervention vs. 
laissez faire and free market” (Lucas 1993: 3). 
26 My understanding of the term ‘ideology’ is relativistic, unlike its common-sense understanding which is often 
pejorative, pointing to the alleged bad faith of political opponents. 22 
 
  
far more interested in filling in cyclical troughs than in shaving off peaks. These 
normative propositions are based on judgments that (a) macroeconomic fluctuations 
significantly  reduce  social  welfare,  (b)  the  government  is  knowledgeable  and 
capable enough to improve upon free-market outcomes, and (c) unemployment is a 
more important problem than inflation (Blinder 1988: 112–3). 
The laissez faire (or anti-Keynesian) view is that the unfettered working of competition will 
lead the economy to the best attainable position. To repeat a well-known aphorism, the state is 
the problem, not the solution. Stabilization policies are neither necessary nor efficient.  
A second factor that casts doubt on the non-ideological character of macroeconomics appears 
when looking at the policy conclusions supported by the main models that have succeeded 
each other over the history of macroeconomics. The results are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. The policy cause defended 
 
  Justifying demand activation  Laissez-faire 
The General Theory  ♦   
The IS-LM model  ♦   
Disequilibrium theory (Patinkin 
and Leijonhufvud) and non-
Walrasian equilibrium models  
♦   
Monetarism    ♦ 
New classical models (Lucas)    ♦ 
New Keynesian models   ♦   
Real  business  cycle  models 
(Kydland & Prescott)    ♦ 
The new neoclassical synthesis  ♦  ♦ 
 
The to-and-fro process illustrated in the table looks incompatible with the hypothesis of an 
unwavering march towards increased knowledge based exclusively on conceptual, technical 
and factual advances. Some additional factors must have played a role. Political agendas are a 
candidate. 
Finally, a third argument is that the policy conclusions which a given theory or model can 
support are constrained by their premises. According to the type of model adopted, certain 
results are possible, others excluded. To wit, an elementary Walrasian model with complete 
markets  and  without  externalities  excludes  coordination  failure  and  states  of 
underemployment.  Of  course, researchers  can  enter  into  a  theoretical  framework  that  has 
policy implications without having a political motivation. More importantly, they can be blind 23 
 
  
to the predetermined character of the policy conclusions of the model they use. Let me refer 
again  to  Kehoe  and  Prescott’s  answer  to  Temin.  Having  stated  that  they  are  engaged  in 
science and not politics, they make the following statement: 
The underlying hypothesis of the book is that the general equilibrium growth model 
is a useful tool for studying great depression episodes. The tentative findings are 
that  bad  government  policies  can  turn  ordinary  economic  downturns  into  great 
depressions.  These  finding  are  especially  relevant  now,  late  2008  (Kehoe  and 
Prescott, 2009, p. 21). 
Following  in  Friedman  and  Schwartz’s  footsteps,  Kehoe  and  Prescott  view  government 
failures (i.e. mistaken policy measures) as responsible for great depressions. They may be 
right, but the problem is that this conclusion is worth little if it is based on a model that 
excludes any other causes, in particular trading malfunctioning, in an a priori way. To really 
determine the reasons for great depressions we should have models that consider all the main 
suspects. In other words, as soon as an equilibrium model is used, the dice are stacked. I 
admit that, at present, disequilibrium models are too hard to construct. In this situation, two 
attitudes are possible. The first is to admit to the limitations of the type of model employed, 
and, as a result, to avoid drawing definite conclusions. The second, taken by Kehoe and 
Prescott, is to be oblivious of the implications of the approach, and to voice blunt conclusion. 
To me, this is a methodological fraud, a case of theoretical hubris, and it has an ideological 
ring. This is possibly what Blinder and Temin had in mind. 
 It is thus well worth pondering the role of ideology in the NC/RBC revolution. The challenge 
is  to  be  able  to  combine  the  statements  made  by  its  leaders  (that  they  had  no  political 
motivation) and the presence of an ideological dimension in their approach. One view that 
needs to be discarded from the outset is that all practitioners of macroeconomics are aware of 
its ideological dimension. Most of them are mere foot soldiers in the regiment. They march in 
step without any need to be aware of where the regiment is coming from or where it is 
heading.  This  being  said,  most  macroeconomists  do  have  ideas  about  the  best  economic 
policy. So, individually, a large number of them could place themselves on the spectrum from 
laissez faire to Keynesian; but often this has no impact on their theoretical practice. There 
may be exceptions, people who consider themselves pure technicians. Some may change their 
minds over time (possibly because of the study of economics). None of this matters for my 
claim. 
Nor  do  I  want  to  claim  that  every  theoretical move  should  be  viewed  as  the  result  of  a 
political agenda. The starting point for engaging in theoretical innovations under the impulse 
of a political agenda is finding that the prevailing paradigm leads to policy conclusions that 
you  dislike.  But  these  are  unusual  situations.  Only  a  few  episodes  in  the  history  of 
macroeconomics, to my mind three, qualify. We have Keynes, who wanted to amend what he 24 
 
  
called classical theory; Friedman, who wanted to recast Keynesian macroeconomics in order 
to reach laissez faire conclusions; and New Keynesian economists who wanted to import 
Keynesian themes into the new theoretical discourse introduced by new classicists and real 
business cycle theorists.  
Note that I have not included either the new classical or the real business cycle episodes in 
this category of politically-motivated theoretical moves (let me repeat that I have nothing 
against these). The reason is that Lucas, Sargent, Kydland and Prescott did not need to act 
upon a political agenda, because Milton Friedman had already carried out much of the job of 
gearing theory towards a political agenda other than the Keynesian!  
Friedman had a political agenda and used macroeconomics in a way that was not conceptually 
revolutionary but marked a radical shift in terms of policy conclusions. Economists like Lucas 
and Sargent boarded the train after it had left. While they held the same laissez faire ideology 
as  Friedman,  they  no  longer  needed  to  promulgate  it.  Rather  they  could  concentrate  on 
working,  as  pure  technicians,  on  the  conceptual  and  technical  modifications  that  were 
necessary  to  provide  firm  ground  for  Friedman’s  policy  conclusions.  In  other  words,  a 
division of labor occurred, with Friedman doing the political job, and the next generation 
undertaking the theoretical developments needed to vindicate the political agenda inaugurated 
by Friedman.  
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, I have tried to make the following points. First, I have criticized the standard 
understanding  of  the  requirement  for  microfoundations,  and  argued  that  a  softer 
understanding  of  it,  admitting  states  of  individual  disequilibrium,  is  more  appropriate. 
Unfortunately, theories based on it  are still non-existent. The NC/RBC revolution can be 
described as a transition from the soft to the demanding understanding of this requirement. It 
implied the a priori expulsion of market non-clearing from macroeconomics. Second, I have 
characterized  the  new  classical  stage  of  the  revolution  as  having  introduced  a  series  of 
novelties:  a  merger  of  the  fields  of  value  theory  and  business  cycle  theory  that  were 
previously separate, the expulsion of unemployment from the agenda of macroeconomics, the 
replacement of Marshallian by Walrasian macroeconomics. Third, I have shown how Kydland 
and Prescott made Lucas’s qualitative model quantitative. I have suggested that if this had not 
been  done,  a  scientific  revolution  à  la  Kuhn  might  not  have  occurred. Fourth,  my  study 
Lucas’s and Kydland and Prescott’s accounts of the NC/RBC shows that, although Prescott 
used the term ‘revolution’, what these authors had in mind was just the uninterrupted march 
of progress, in contrast to my own interpretation and a far cry from a Kuhnian perspective. 
Fifth, I have addressed the challenge of conciliating the assertion made by the leaders of the 
NC/RBC revolution that they were doing science without a political agenda with the fact that 25 
 
  
laissez faire policies are a foregone conclusion in their models. This has been possible, I have 
argued, because the job of putting forward the laissez faire political agenda had previously 
been carried out by Friedman, so that his disciples could devote themselves to the task of 
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